Sir Edward Grey's Speech to Parliament and Britain's Entry into WWI
From a modern perspective, the first world war was disastrous for Britain. The nation’s wartime sacrifices included the lives of approximately ¾ million of her subjects, several million dollars worth of debt, and her 19th century social and economic stability, leading some to deem the British war effort “horrifying and fruitless.”[1] In his speech to Parliament in August of 1914, Sir Edward Grey admitted that Britain was not bound by any obligations to assist France and Russia in their dispute with the Central Powers. What, then, could have enticed the British into a war that was not their own and that would require the payment of such tragic costs? A close look at the arguments presented in Grey’s parliamentary speech reveal that the question of obligation and honour for Britain was far more complex than an issue of treaties and pacts, but came down to her position as a world power precariously balanced on a European political scale. In the summer of 1914, Britain’s involvement in the warring of her neighbours across the channel came from her efforts to prevent the scale from tipping and spelling out her ruin along with that of the others.
Prior to the July Crisis, Britain had upheld a long tradition of involving itself in national disputes only when doing so was absolutely vital to the preservation of British interests; that
being said, it would not have been out of character for Britain to pledge neutrality in this western European conflict.[2] Grey initially approached the crisis with the same detachment with which Britain had faced the Balkan Crisis of two years prior; however, the rapid mobilization of Russian troops against Germany threw Britain off balance and forced Grey to the realization that this crisis was different; the old tactics of cooperation and negotiation worked when all the powers’ desired peace, but this time around, conflict was being actively sought.[3] Despite Edward Grey’s attempts at pacification, “Germany and Austria...marched steadily into war.”[4]
The key difference preventing Britain from upholding her position on the European sidelines was that this time, her own security was at stake, and she could not afford the luxury of detachment she had exercised when Austria and Russia were tussling in the Balkans two years prior.[5] Britain’s security depended on the maintenance of the European power balance, and she interpreted the actions of Berlin as those of an aggressor attempting to overthrow that balance. If the Germans were after a political dictatorship, then Britain was obliged to oppose her out of her own interests, not in squabbles for Balkan territory, but in preserving the balance of power in the West; in this way, the interests of Britain were aligned with those of France and Russia.[6]
As seen in the House comments that accompanied Grey’s parliamentary speech, Britain’s relationships with her neighbours could have swayed her to the side of either cause.[7] Britain had existing friendships with German, Russia, and France, but these were tentative at best; while relations with Germany had indeed deteriorated in recent years, Britain was equally suspicious of the Franco-Russian allies, whom she viewed as imperial rivals.[8]
The perception of the conflict as a defensive war did much to solidify Britain’s position. Britain interpreted the aggressive action the July Crisis as resulting from a power shift in Berlin from a peace party to a Prussian militarist war party. How to overcome this regime was a subject of controversy; a faction of British policy-makers believed that to return Europe to a relative political equilibrium, German militarism must be eradicated to such a decisive degree that the military be forever discredited and void of future influence. General Douglas Haig is quoted as insisting that the “democratising of Germany” was not “worth the loss of a single Englishman!”[9] To accomplish the necessary “crushing military defeat,” Britain would need to side with Russia and France—especially France, whom Grey saw as a victim “engaged in a war which [she] had not sought.”[10]
Germany’s ultimatum threatening to violate the neutrality of Belgium had perhaps the most decisive impact on Britain’s involvement. Britain had what Grey called, “great and vital interests” in insuring that Belgium remained neutral and stayed out of the control of other European powers.[11] Many European exports entered the continent by way of the independent Low Countries, while their neutrality prevented potential enemies from using their coasts to invade Britain.[12] The violation of Belgian neutrality provided Britain with a moral cause to champion, as Grey’s descriptions of submissive Belgium “under duress” and of a “patriotic” and France “beaten to her knees” elicited loud cheers from the House and set them on a course to oppose Germany and the “unmeasured aggrandisement of any power.”[13] The violation of Belgium’s independence was of such offense to British interests that if, as Grey claimed, the only way to definitively remove Britain from war was to proclaim unconditional neutrality, then Britain’s involvement in the war was nearly certain.[14]
Though it can be agreed that Britain was intent on acting according to her own interests, what exactly her best interests were remains a matter of debate. Surely the war predicted by Grey, which involved incredibly suffering and economic stagnation, if not ruin, was not in the best interest of the nation?[15] Grey suggested that in the short term, Britain held a good chance of survival by remaining outside the conflict and allowing the other western powers to destroy themselves in a war. However, should France fall to the power of Germany, Britain would then be faced with a superpower German enemy that she would not be able to overcome—especially friendless as she would inevitably be, having alienated her former allies by abandoning them prior to the war.[16] Thus, whatever immediate security Britain gained from avoiding a war now would only call for her later demise; Britain could not allow Germany to take over France.
It was not only Germany whom Britain wanted to hold back. As previously stated, Britain’s security came from a balance of European power, and the aggrandisement of any one nation was a threat. With this in mind, Britain believed she could work steer events in her favour by helping France and Russia weaken Germany, but not to a point that they themselves became superpowers at Germany’s expense.[17]
Unable to foresee the devastating losses that were to come, Britain anticipated that her contributions to the Franco-Russian war effort would consist of monetary aid and the use of the Royal Navy, while her allies took care of the land fighting.[18] This tragically optimistic manner of warfare—one of “maximum victory at minimum cost”—was particularly appealing to Britain, as Germany had developed into a considerable naval threat.[19] With France’s fleet occupied in the Mediterranean, Grey feared and insisted that he would not tolerate a hostile engagement in the English Channel.[20] Germany, whom Britain had already marked as a trade rival for outstripping her in electrical and chemical industry, had provoked her by constructing a rival fleet. Britain responded to the challenge presented to her dominance of seas by embarking with Germany on a naval arms race. If a conflict for Britain was to arise at all, it was better to have a naval war than a land war, and “never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the Navy”.[21]
In the end, there was no course of action that could save Britain from some sort of harm. “[If] we engage in a war,” said Grey, “we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.”[22] If Britain allied herself with Russia and France, she risked her political prominence as well as all the suffering that accompanies war. If she remained neutral, however, she risked the good opinion of her neighbours and the threat of succumbing to superpower enemies in a friendless and uncertain future in which whatever securities she had gained from avoiding the initial war would be immaterial.[23]
Though it could appear at first glance as though the toll of Britain’s sacrifices could have been avoided by removing herself from the war, the extent to which Britain’s security depended on the political balance of Europe as a whole prove that such a thing could not be done. The arguments presented by Sir Edward Grey in his parliamentary speech depict Britain as a nation whose interests and security were entangled in the fates of her continental neighbours, making her entry into World War I not only justified, but necessary and unavoidable.
[1] David French, “Allies, Rivals and Enemies: British Strategy and War Aims during the First World War,” Britain and the First World War (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1988), 22; John Turner, “Introduction,” Ibid, 2.
[2] Spencer C. Tucker, The Great War: 1914-1918 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 5.
[3] (1914) “Sir Edward Grey’s Speech Before Parliament” [Online]. Available: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Sir_Edward_Grey%27s_Speech_Before_Parliament [2011, October].
[4] Grey, quoted in Lowe and Dockrill, The Mirage of Power, vol. III, 489, in Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977), 227.
[5] Steiner, 217.
[6] Ibid, 222.
[7] “Sir Edward Grey’s Speech Before Parliament.”
[8] French, 23.
[9] The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1918, ed. Robert Blake (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952), 277, in French, 23.
[10] Steiner, 241; “Sir Edward Grey’s Speech Before Parliament.”
[11] “Sir Edward Grey’s Speech Before Parliament.”
[12] Tucker, 9.
[13] “Sir Edward Grey’s Speech Before Parliament.”
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid, 5-6.
[16] Ibid, 6.
[17] Turner, 24.
[18] Ibid, 25.
[19] Ibid.
[20] “Sir Edward Grey’s Speech Before Parliament.”
[21] Steiner, 230; “Sir Edward Grey’s Speech Before Parliament.”
[22] “Sir Edward Grey’s Speech Before Parliament.”
[23] Ibid, 5.
